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1Many markets for farm output are plausibly characterized by some degree of imperfect
competition. This is certainly true in most fruit and vegetable markets where growers are
numerous, and where intermediation is relatively concentrated. Processing or packing coop-
eratives, and cooperative bargaining among farmers, may in some instances be institutional
responses to these market imperfections. For example, Sexton (1990) studies the role that
processing cooperatives can play in promoting competitive behavior among non-cooperative
processors. In the case of farm bargaining, a number of authors have argued that collec-
tive price negotiation by growers can countervail the market power of intermediaries; see
for example, Helmberger and Hoos (1965) and Ladd (1964). These perspectives emphasize
the eﬀects of cooperation on market structure, and on the transfer of economic surplus from
intermediaries, and possibly consumers, to growers. An alternative view—the one we ex-
plore in this article—is that cooperative bargaining by farmers has eﬃciency consequences
independent of changes in market structure.
This view is motivated in part by the fact that price negotiation is just one of many
services provided by bargaining associations (Iskow and Sexton, 1992), and by a lack of
evidence supporting signiﬁcant price enhancement resulting from bargaining (Hueth and
Marcoul, 2003). Additional motivation comes from the observation that bargaining occurs
primarily in commodities where spot market activity for farm output is relatively minor
in comparison with contract procurement. In this context, annual price negotiations can
serve as a mechanism for price discovery. Moreover, given the natural opposition of interests
between growers and processors, there is a built-in mechanism to ensure that information
exchange among intermediaries does not support collusion, as some have argued might occur
with the recently implemented livestock price reporting requirements (Njoroge, 2003).1
Given these observations, we model “farm bargaining” as a contract that enforces partici-
pation of intermediary ﬁrms in information sharing activities.2 Each ﬁrm truthfully reports
private information about a common uncertain future demand shock, and the bargaining as-
sociation reports back, indirectly via a bargained price for farm output, a suﬃcient statistic
of ﬁrm reports that is used for prediction. We show that, independent of whether infor-
mation sharing changes market structure, such a contract leads to an increase in aggregate
welfare, and always beneﬁts growers. In some settings, even when there is a change in market
2structure favoring growers, ﬁrms also beneﬁt from information sharing, and thus potentially
have an incentive to voluntarily participate.
Thus, information sharing potentially generates Pareto gains, though most of these gains
accrue to growers. Interestingly, it turns out that even when there are Pareto gains, infor-
mation sharing can only be implemented contractually. Firms potentially face a Prisoners
Dilemma where they are better oﬀ when information is fully shared, but where each ﬁrm’s
equilibrium strategy in a noncooperative game is to not report its information. Given that
anti-trust laws restrict the use of a private contract to overcome this equilibrium, we there-
fore demonstrate that formal bargaining legislation can be welfare improving, if the primary
role of bargaining is to facilitate price discovery.
In addition to developing a possible role for bargaining activity in agricultural markets
unrelated to price enhancement, our article contributes to the literature on information
sharing. Existing information sharing models ignore the upstream input market by assuming
a constant marginal production cost for intermediaries. Earlier works, for example Vives
(1990) and Kirby (1988), suggest that trade associations can play a role in information
sharing, though the exact mechanism through which this is achieved is not described. Here,
information sharing is implemented by collective determination of the farm price. This is
possible because the price is a monotonic function of a suﬃcient statistic of all the information
possessed by intermediary ﬁrms.
In what follows, we begin with a description of bargaining in agricultural markets. We then
develop a model of information sharing in the spirit of work by Vives (1984), Raith (1996),
and Li (1985) (see Vives (1999), Chapter 8 for a summary of this literature), and demon-
strate how information sharing, implemented via farm bargaining, can lead to Pareto gains.
Throughout our article we assume that any information transmitted from processors to the
bargaining association is veriﬁable in the sense that processors can choose not to report their
information, but conditional on reporting, they must report truthfully. We thus ignore the
possibility for strategic misreporting. This assumption, which is standard in the information-
sharing literature, is provided some justiﬁcation by the results of Milgrom (1981), Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990). These authors
study equilibrium strategic reporting in settings where ﬁrms can certify the validity of any
3information that is reported, but where ﬁrms can also choose not to report (i.e, to conceal)
some information. In many contexts, including the one we study (see example 8, Okuno-
Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990), the unique equilibrium reporting strategy is
full information disclosure. The rough intuition for this so-called “unraveling” result is that
it is diﬃcult for ﬁrms to credibly conceal their information. If a given ﬁrm has an incentive
to conceal information, other ﬁrms will know that such incentives exist and will adjust their
interpretations of the information that is revealed accordingly. Even in the absence of com-
plete unraveling (i.e., all private information fully disclosed), allowing ﬁrms to communicate
tends to result in at least some information revelation.3,4
Bargaining and Price Discovery in Agricultural Markets
Our intent in this section is not to provide an exhaustive overview of agricultural bargaining,
but rather to point out ways in which descriptions of the institutional features of bargaining
associations seem consistent with the notion that, in addition to changing market structure,
bargaining facilitates price discovery via formalized “information sharing.”
Bargaining occurs primarily in markets for processing fruits and vegetables (Hueth and
Marcoul, 2003). This particular set of markets comprises only a portion of all agricultural
markets, and it is natural to ask why bargaining associations are not more widespread? If
the success of bargaining as an institution hinges on delivering higher prices to growers, we
should perhaps expect to observe bargaining in a larger class of commodities. In this respect,
it is noteworthy that fruit and vegetable processors obtain their output primarily through
forward contracts, so that traditional modes of price discovery are mostly absent. Moreover,
procurement decisions are typically made in the context of uncertainty about the state of
future demand, for example, prior to planting. To the extent that price negotiations during
bargaining facilitate industry-wide communication about future demand, bargaining can be
viewed as an indirect price discovery mechanism.
Results and discussion from two studies of farm bargaining seem consistent with this
notion. First, in a national survey of fruit and vegetable bargaining associations, Iskow and
Sexton (1992) note that “the majority of associations felt their role was not only to improve
the well-being of grower-members, but also to provide services to processors.” Of the services
4provided, “increased price stability,” “improved information,” and “improved price discovery
process” were most frequently cited.5 Lacking similar responses from processing ﬁrms, it is
diﬃcult to know whether, in fact, such services were provided and valued. Nevertheless,
that nearly all respondents viewed price discovery and improved information as important
services provided by their respective associations is certainly consistent with the hypothesis
that an important consequence of farm bargaining is information transmission among market
participants.6
Similarly, Bunje (1980, pg. 6)7 oﬀers a comprehensive description of bargaining in U.S.
agricultural markets. In summarizing the role of farm bargaining he notes that:
“Bargaining associations can ﬁll the needs of the market as well as the needs of
the individual producer. They can serve a supply coordinating function for the
market and furnish market intelligence for the producer. They can operate as a
price discovery vehicle, establish market prices, and establish uniform terms of
trade that serve the producer and the marketplace.”
While such a quote might be viewed as self-serving coming from a representative of bargaining
associations, it again conveys the idea that, at least in the minds of those who operate
bargaining associations, bargaining is more than simply “price enhancement.”
Of course, there are many other possible explanations for the relative prominence of bar-
gaining in processing fruit and vegetable markets. For example, Knoeber (1983) notes that
“liquidated damage” clauses in contracts between a bargaining association and member
growers (or “most-favored customer” clauses in contracts between a bargaining association
and processors) can mitigate incentives for either party to renege on contract terms. To the
extent that contract reliability is a problem peculiar to processing fruit and vegetable mar-
kets, the beneﬁts from third party, i.e., bargaining association, contract enforcement may be
relatively high. Alternatively, it may indeed be the case that the degree of imperfect com-
petition in these markets is particularly severe. For example, Iskow and Sexton (1992) note
that the four largest ﬁrms handled over 75 percent of total production in 23 of 34 markets
studied.
In any case, it is not our intent in the present article to identify empirically the primary
role of bargaining in agricultural markets. Indeed, it is entirely possible that bargaining
5serves multiple roles. Our more modest goal is to identify and analyze a role for bargaining
that seems to have gone mostly unnoticed in formal analyses of the farm bargaining problem.
Importantly, our analysis suggests that bargaining, to the extent that it results in “infor-
mation sharing,” is eﬃciency enhancing. This is in contrast to the “price enhancement”
hypothesis, which suggests the possibility of net welfare losses from farm bargaining.
We begin our analysis below by developing an oligopoly model of n ﬁrms that produce
substitute ﬁnal goods, and who obtain their raw farm input from a group of homogeneous
growers represented by an aggregate supply relation. Prior to procurement, each ﬁrm is
uncertain about the true state of future demand, but receives an imperfect signal of demand.
We study private incentives for ﬁrms to share (or pool) their signals, and corresponding
welfare implications. In this context, we interpret the communication that occurs during the
annual bargaining process, and potentially the setting of a bargained price for contracted
output, as a means of implementing information sharing.
Model
The Setup
There are n ﬁrms who convert farm output into a vector of ﬁnal consumption goods q =
(q1,...,qn), where qi represents the quantity of ﬁnal goods sold by ﬁrm i. For simplicity,
we suppose that each ﬁrm transforms qi into ﬁnal output in Leontief fashion with constant
marginal cost (normalized to zero), and, moreover, that a single unit of farm output yields a
single unit of ﬁnal output. Thus, for given output price pi(qi,q−i), and farm price r(qi,q−i),
ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by Πi(qi,q−i) = [pi(qi,q−i) − r(qi,q−i)]qi, where q−i represents the
n−1 vector of outputs for ﬁrms other than ﬁrm i. Growers are represented by an aggregate
supply function r = a + bQ, where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the aggregate quantity of farm output.8
Final goods are diﬀerentiated and valued by a representative consumer with utility function

















where β > γ > 0, α > 0, and where ε is a normally distributed, aggregate source of uncer-
tainty from the perspective of growers and intermediaries. We suppose that all uninformed
6agents believe that ε has mean 0 and variance σε. For a given vector of prices p = (p1,...,pn),
consumers choose quantities to maximize U(q)−
Pn
i=1 piqi, yielding inverse demand schedules
for each ﬁrm’s output given by




The timing of actions in our model is as follows: In period 0, each intermediary ﬁrm
privately receives an independent and costless signal, si = ε + νi, where νi is distributed
normally and independently of ε with E[νi] = 0, E[ν2
i ] = σν, E[νiνj] = 0 for i 6= j. Each si
represents imperfect, though unbiased, information on the state of future demand.9 Infor-
mally, we can think of processing ﬁrms, as part of their everyday business activities, receiving
information from their respective buyers about the current state of demand. Based on these
signals, ﬁrms form expectations in period 1 about demand in period 2, and coordinate with
growers for delivery of some quantity of farm output that arrives in period 2. Expectations
depend on the information available to each ﬁrm, and we consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst,
each ﬁrm keeps its information private, and forms an expectation based on si (for ﬁrm i).
Alternatively, ﬁrms pool their information and form expectations based on the full vector
of signals s = (s1,...,sn). Finally, in period 2, ﬁrms noncooperatively choose prices to
maximize their individual proﬁt, given the quantities of output arranged for delivery in the
previous period. We assume “eﬃcient rationing” (e.g., Tirole, 1989) of quantities, so that
equilibrium prices in period 2 are just those that form an equilibrium when all quantities
are delivered to the market.
The structure of this market is formally equivalent to Bertrand competition with ﬁrms
choosing capacities in an ex ante period; here “capacities” are given by the quantity of output
arranged for delivery during period 1. For this equivalence to hold, it is, of course, essential
that no ﬁrm have the opportunity to obtain additional output in period 2 relative to what
was arranged for delivery during period 1. This is a natural feature of the markets we study,
given the time interval required to produce most kinds of farm output.10 However, we ignore
the possibility for storage and the role of inventories. This omission is potentially important
if ﬁrms hold inventories for purely strategic reasons; see for example, Saloner (1986) and
Rotemberg and Saloner (1989). If ﬁrms instead hold inventories primarily to smooth demand
7or supply shocks, as in for example, Blinder (1986), we can think of inventories as one of the
pieces of information that ﬁrms “share” during bargaining.
Market Equilibrium Without Information Sharing
In period 1, after each ﬁrm receives its signal si, the ﬁrms play a Cournot game in choosing
quantities of output for delivery in period 2. For given qi, the conditional expected proﬁt of
ﬁrm i is given by
(3) Π(qi,q−i|si) =
Ã






where α = α − a, β = β + b, and γ = γ + b. Let ρ = σε/(σε + σν) represent the correlation
between si and sj. Then ﬁrms update their priors on ε with the formula E[ε|si] = ρsi, which
is a weighted average of the prior and si.
Firm i chooses qi to maximize conditional expected proﬁt, given expectations about ε
and the production decisions of other ﬁrms. For any given strategy used by other ﬁrms
(conditional on other ﬁrms’ signals), ﬁrm i’s best response is given by
(4) qi(q−i) =





We ﬁnd the equilibrium for this game by ﬁrst supposing that ﬁrms use strategies that are
aﬃne in their signals, and then by verifying that these strategies indeed form an equilibrium
(Radner, 1962). Letting ﬁrm i’s equilibrium strategy be given by qi = c0 + c1si, and noting
that E[sj|si] = ρsi, it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium is obtained setting
c0 = α/δ, and c1 = ρ/δρ, where δ = 2β +(n−1)γ, and δρ = 2β +(n−1)γρ. The equilibrium










For future reference, we note that E[q
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ρ, for i 6= j.
The full information equilibrium level of production when ε equals its expected value
of zero is given by α/δ, so that ﬁrms increase or decrease their output relative to this
8benchmark, depending on whether the realization of si is greater or less than zero. The
variance of signal noise σν has an ambiguous eﬀect on the slope term ρ/δρ. On the one hand,
as σν decreases, ﬁrms put more weight on their signals relative to their prior, and this makes
ﬁrms more responsive to their signals. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the numerator of the second
term in equation (5) where a decrease in σν increases ρ. On the other hand, a decrease
in σν increases the correlation of ﬁrms’ signals. This, in turn, implies that if some ﬁrm,
say ﬁrm i, receives information suggesting high demand, it is likely that other ﬁrms have
received similar information. Because the outputs of each ﬁrm are strategic substitutes, an
equilibrium response to this is a reduction in ﬁrm i’s output. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the
denominator, where a decrease in σν increases δρ. Changes in σε have a similarly ambiguous,
though reciprocal, eﬀect on ﬁrm responsiveness. A reduction in σε lowers the weight placed
on each ﬁrm’s signal, making ﬁrms less responsive, but also reduces the correlation of signals,
and this tends to increase responsiveness.
Ex ante expected proﬁt for each ﬁrm prior to observing their signal si, but anticipating








which from (3) and (4) reduces to Πp = βE[(q
p
i)2]. Direct calculation from (5) then yields









The ﬁrst term in this expression represents the proﬁts each ﬁrm would receive if there were
no uncertainty (σε = 0). From this term, expected proﬁts are high when aggregate demand
and supply are high (high α or low a), or when the total price decrease resulting from a small
increase in each ﬁrm’s output is small (low δ). The second term, which is strictly positive
so long as σν is ﬁnite, reﬂects the beneﬁt from receiving a signal, relative to no information
at all.
One consequence of information sharing is an increase in the precision with which ﬁrms
estimate ε. Thus, before considering the market equilibrium with information sharing, it
is instructive to consider how a reduction in the variance of the signal error σν (which
reduces the variance of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε) aﬀects expected ﬁrm proﬁts when there
9is no information sharing. From (7), a reduction in σν has a similar qualitative eﬀect on
proﬁts as on the equilibrium responsiveness of each ﬁrm’s output to their signal (described
above). Firms beneﬁt from a reduction in the variance of signal noise because their output
decision more accurately reﬂects actual demand conditions. In particular, the mean square
error of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε (given by σεσν/(σε + σν)) falls when σν falls. However,
because the signals of each ﬁrm become more correlated, equilibrium outputs also have
greater correlation, and this tends to reduce expected proﬁts. This ambiguity suggests
that whether or not ﬁrms gain from information sharing will generally depend on a direct
comparison of expected proﬁts in each regime. In the next section, we derive an expression
for expected ﬁrm proﬁts when information is shared, and make this comparison.
Market Equilibrium With Full Information Sharing
Here, we suppose that some mechanism is available for ﬁrms to truthfully report their in-
formation. After characterizing equilibrium outcomes and evaluating welfare contingent on
truthful reporting, we then oﬀer two complementary interpretations of how bargaining can
represent the relevant reporting mechanism.
Information sharing, if it is implemented via farm bargaining, will necessarily lead to a
change in market structure. Thus, to disentangle the eﬀects of information sharing from a
change in market structure, we ﬁrst maintain our assumption that ﬁrms act as oligopsonists
in the market for farm output. In the subsequent section, we suppose that information
sharing is implemented by specifying a ﬁxed price for the farm output, so that, in eﬀect,
intermediary ﬁrms act competitively in this market. As one might expect, growers (and
consumers) always gain from such a change in market structure, while expected ﬁrm proﬁts
fall (relative to the information sharing equilibrium with no change in market structure).
When information sharing occurs, each ﬁrm receives the best estimate of ε, given by
E[ε|s] = ρns, where ρn = σε/(σε +σν/n), and s is the mean value of the vector s (DeGroot,
1970). There is no need to transmit the whole vector of signals s, because the average signal
s is a suﬃcient statistic to estimate the demand parameter. Proceeding as in the previous
10section, ﬁrm i’s reaction function is then given by
(8) qi(q−i) =




















Thus, equilibrium expected output is the same, regardless of whether or not ﬁrms share
information on their common demand uncertainty. Firms are more responsive to their ag-








and it is straightforward to verify that this condition is always satisﬁed (for β > γ). In-
formation sharing increases the precision of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε, and this makes ﬁrms
more responsive to their signals; but information sharing also leads to perfect correlation in
ﬁrms’ strategies, and this makes ﬁrms less responsive to their signals. Because inequality
(10) is always satisﬁed, the net eﬀect of these countervailing forces is an increase in ﬁrm
responsiveness.
As in the previous section, expected ﬁrm proﬁts are given by (β times) the expected value
of equilibrium quantity squared. Thus, expected ﬁrm proﬁts with information sharing are








and comparison of proﬁts under each regime reduces to a comparison between the relative
magnitudes of ρn/δ2 and ρ/δ2
ρ.
Welfare Comparison
We evaluate the eﬀect of information sharing on total expected welfare, and on the expected
welfare of ﬁrms, consumers, and growers individually. We evaluate ex ante welfare (prior to
the ﬁrms receiving their signals), but suppose, as in the previous section, that ﬁrms anticipate
11the equilibrium outcome in either scenario for a given realization of s. We begin with the
diﬀerence in expected ﬁrm proﬁts with and without information sharing.
It is straightforward (though somewhat tedious) to show that Πs ≥ Πp whenever
(12) 4β(β − γ) − (n − 1)γ
2(1 + nρ) ≥ 0.
Thus, information sharing leads to higher expected ﬁrm proﬁts when outputs are highly
diﬀerentiated (γ small), own demand is relatively inelastic (β large), there are few ﬁrms, or
when the correlation among ﬁrms’ signals is small (σε small and σν large)
Intuitively, a high degree of product diﬀerentiation is analogous to each ﬁrm acting as
a monopolist in the downstream market for farm output. Improved information on future
demand increases each ﬁrm’s ability to price discriminate, and this in turn increases expected
proﬁtability. Firms similarly gain from information sharing when own demand is suﬃciently
inelastic. Finally, when there are a small number of ﬁrms, and when the correlation among
ﬁrms’ signals is relatively weak, correlation among ﬁrms’ strategies is relatively unimportant,
and this tends to make information sharing more attractive to ﬁrms.
Surplus for growers is given by 1
2(r(Q) − a)Q = b







i] + (n − 1)E[qiqj]
¢
.
Using the expressions for E[q2
i] and E[qiqj] obtained in the previous sections, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that growers always beneﬁt from information sharing. Intuitively, both grow-
ers and ﬁrms gain from increased precision in estimating aggregate demand. However, the
increase in correlation among ﬁrms’ outputs lowers expected ﬁrm proﬁts, and increases ex-
pected grower surplus. Thus, the two eﬀects associated with information sharing—increased
precision in estimating aggregate demand and increased correlation among ﬁrms’ outputs—
are countervailing with respect to ﬁrm proﬁts, but complementary with respect to grower
surplus. This result can also be interpreted in light of results from the literature on price
stabilization where growers beneﬁt from the increased variance of output; see, for example,
Waugh (1944), Oi (1961), and Massell (1969). Here, growers gain from an increase in output
variance that results from information sharing, but also from increased competition among
intermediaries.
12Consumer surplus is given by U(q) −
Pn
i=1 piqi. Taking expectations, and assuming equi-
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.
As with grower surplus, the eﬀects of information sharing on consumer surplus tend to com-
plement, though to a lesser degree since E[qiqj] is weighted by γ < β. Using the expressions
for E[q2






δ2(β + (n − 1)γρ)
δ2
ρ(β + (n − 1)γ)
.
Because ρ < 1, if information sharing leads to higher expected proﬁts for ﬁrms, then expected
consumer surplus also increases. Further, note that when b = 0 this inequality will always be
satisﬁed because then δ = 2β +(n−1)γ and δρ = 2β +(n−1)γρ. For b > 0, condition (15)
will generally hold, but can be violated. Thus, consumers generally gain from information
sharing, though we cannot rule out the possibility that expected consumer surplus falls.







i] + (n − 1)γE[qiqj]
¢
.





δ2(3β + (n − 1)γρ)
δ2
ρ(3β + (n − 1)γ)
.
Though not immediately apparent from the inequality in (17), the following proposition,
which also summarizes the eﬀects of information sharing on grower and consumer surplus,
demonstrates that total expected surplus always increases when information is shared.
Proposition 1 (Welfare). Information sharing always beneﬁts growers and increases ex-
pected total welfare. Expected consumer surplus increases whenever expected ﬁrm proﬁts
increase, and may increase even as expected ﬁrm proﬁts fall.
Proof: see Appendix.
13Because the expressions for changes in expected proﬁt and consumer surplus resulting
from information sharing yield ambiguous results, we evaluate these measures (along with
expected grower and total surplus) for a particular speciﬁcation of our model. We set n = 5,
α = 1, β = 0.3, a = 0, b = 0.1, σε = 0.3, and σν = .1. With this speciﬁcation, we
then let γ range from 0 to β and evaluate diﬀerences in expected surplus with and without
information sharing. The results are displayed in Figure 1. When outputs are suﬃciently
substitutable, expected ﬁrm proﬁts fall if information is shared, though by a relatively small
amount. Growers gain most from information sharing when outputs are highly diﬀerentiated.
Interestingly, the change in expected consumer surplus with information sharing is initially
increasing with the degree of product substitutability, then decreasing.
Figure 2 displays the results of a similar comparative static, but where we hold γ constant
at 0.05, and let n range between 2 and 10 ﬁrms. Again, information sharing leads to a
decrease in expected ﬁrm proﬁts, but now for n suﬃciently large. Information sharing
beneﬁts growers (and to a lesser degree, consumers) by a larger amount, as the number of
ﬁrms increase.
Though not reported, a decrease in b (making supply more elastic for any given quantity of
aggregate output) increases expected consumer surplus with information sharing, and reduces
expected surplus for growers. In all cases analyzed, expected consumer surplus increases
from information sharing, and the beneﬁt to ﬁrms is relatively small, even negative. When
expected proﬁts are negative, there is scope for a collusive arrangement between growers and
ﬁrms because grower surplus increases by at least as much as ﬁrm proﬁts fall. This form of
collusion does not require a restriction on the quantity traded between growers and ﬁrms.
Finally, one further point: In the context of agricultural markets, supply is an important
source of uncertainty, in addition to demand. Adding supply uncertainty to our model
changes very little, and even enhances the potential role for a bargaining association, if the
association can collect information about aggregate supply that is unavailable to each ﬁrm
individually. To see this, suppose that r = a + η + bQ, where now η is an aggregate source
of supply uncertainty over which the association and ﬁrms share a common (normal) prior
with E[η] = 0 and E[η2] = ση. If the association receives a signal s0 = η +ω with E[ω] = 0,
E[ω2] = σω, and E[s0si] = 0 for all i, then it is simple to verify that adding s0 to s in the
14information sharing regime unambiguously increases expected welfare for all parties, relative
to information sharing without s0. It seems plausible that a bargaining association, through
its communication with all member growers (rather than the growers of a single processor)
can add important information concerning current-period supply conditions, thus further
enhancing the “price discovery” role of bargaining.
Information Sharing, Bargaining, and Market Structure
So far, we have shown that information sharing among ﬁrms, where ﬁrms truthfully report
their signals, can lead to a market equilibrium that Pareto dominates the equilibrium with
no information sharing. However, we have yet to establish a strong connection between
“information sharing” and “bargaining.” In this section we make this connection explicit.
First, we show that in the absence of a formal commitment to report their information, ﬁrms’
equilibrium strategy is to not report. This is true even when ﬁrms unambiguously gain from
information sharing. This Prisoner’s Dilemma can be overcome with an ex ante commitment
to report. Bargaining legislation, which requires ﬁrms to engage in “good-faith” bargaining,
can be interpreted as one way to achieve such a commitment. A private contract among
ﬁrms is potentially another means of achieving commitment, though presumably this would
violate anti-trust. Thus, we might also interpret bargaining legislation as an exception to
anti-trust where ﬁrms are permitted to communicate indirectly via the relevant bargaining
entity.
Second, we show that setting a ﬁxed price for farm output, where the price implicitly
transmits a suﬃcient statistic of all ﬁrms’ information, rather than allowing ﬁrms to engage
in Cournot competition in the input market, implements an information sharing equilibrium
where all parties potentially gain. Thus, despite a change in market structure in favor of
growers (as occurs when moving from Cournot oligopoly to competition), the information
sharing or “price discovery” beneﬁts associated with bargaining can result in Pareto gains.
Private Incentives to Reveal Veriﬁable Information. When we examine each ﬁrm’s private
incentive to share veriﬁable information, a ﬁrm increases its expected proﬁts by not re-
porting, given that all other ﬁrms have reported truthfully and that reports become public
information.11 More formally, suppose that ﬁrms play a two-stage game where each ﬁrm can
15choose whether or not to participate in information sharing in the ﬁrst stage, and then con-
ditional on participation, truthfully report its signal or report nothing and choose quantities
and prices noncooperatively in the second stage. The following proposition, adapted from
Raith (1996), summarizes the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium of this game:
Proposition 2 (Information Revelation). In the two-stage game where ﬁrms ﬁrst decide
whether or not to participate in information sharing, and then report their signal to other
ﬁrms and choose quantities and prices non-cooperatively (conditional on the vector of equi-
librium ﬁrst-stage reports), each ﬁrm’s dominant equilibrium ﬁrst-stage strategy is to not
report its signal.
Proof: see Appendix.
In other words, given that all ﬁrms j 6= i report their signals truthfully, ﬁrm i gains by
deviating and reporting nothing. Intuitively, given that all other ﬁrms report their signals,
ﬁrm i obtains the full beneﬁts from increased precision in estimating aggregate demand,
and, by withholding its signal, reduces the correlation among equilibrium outputs. This
unambiguously raises expected proﬁts for ﬁrm i, relative to the equilibrium in which it also
reports its signal.
Thus, ﬁrms potentially face a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which all parties gain from informa-
tion sharing, but equilibrium behavior is to not share. However, assuming veriﬁability of
information reports, there is a simple way to avoid this outcome: Firms can contractually
commit to report their information.12 Moreover, contract enforcement in this context only
requires that each ﬁrm be obligated to participate in information sharing. Bargaining legis-
lation that requires each ﬁrms’ participation in annual price negotiations possibly represents
one means of implementing such a contract. Similarly, the annual bargaining activity itself,
where industry data are collected and studied for the purpose of price negotiation, provides
an opportunity to verify information reports.
“Bargaining” as Information Sharing. The previous subsection demonstrates that bargain-
ing legislation (as a contractual commitment and as a communication mechanism that cir-
cumvents anti-trust restrictions) can facilitate information sharing among ﬁrms. Moreover,
we know that when there is no change in market structure, information sharing can generate
16Pareto gains. In this case, all parties have an ex ante incentive to participate in information-
sharing. However, depending on their relative bargaining strengths, and on the degree of
commitment that can be collectively exercised by ﬁrms and growers, there are various pos-
sibilities for a change in market structure. For example, in the extreme, ﬁrms and growers
might reach a collusive outcome by specifying the monopoly output vis-` a-vis consumers, with
the resulting monopoly surplus divided according to their relative bargaining strengths. As
mentioned in our introduction, this outcome seems unlikely because it requires that aggre-
gate output be contractible. Returns in such an equilibrium would potentially encourage
entry, particularly at the farm level, and create enforcement diﬃculties for the cartel.
More plausibly, growers might try to collectively negotiate terms of trade that are superior
to those that can be obtained by any grower acting alone. In this spirit, suppose that
a bargaining association can set a price for farm output, and that ﬁrms respond to this
price given their Cournot behavior in the downstream market. This forces ﬁrms to compete
in the market for farm output, though they still act as oligopolists with respect to the
downstream market for ﬁnal output. With the same reasoning used to study information
sharing with no change in market structure, it is simple to verify that for any given price r,
equilibrium demand for ﬁrm i with information s is given by qb
i(r) = (α−r +ρns)/δ, where
δ = 2β + (n − 1)γ, and ex ante expected proﬁts are given by Πb = βE[(qb
i)2].
We consider whether there is an input price r at which both ﬁrms and growers can be
made better oﬀ than under the non-sharing equilibrium. Given existence of such a price,
there is clearly potential for information sharing, which simultaneously results in a change
in market structure, to represent an equilibrium market phenomena.13 Perhaps the most




this price, growers are on their supply schedule. Given that ﬁrms act competitively with
respect to the input market (though they still compete as oligopolists in the downstream
market), this price eﬀectively implements the price and quantities that would be observed
in a competitive market for the farm input. The following proposition demonstrates that,
at this price, and for a slightly more restrictive condition than β > γ, there exist market
environments where both ﬁrms and growers gain from information sharing:







. Then with information
sharing and input price rc =
¡
aδ + bn(α + ρns)
¢
/(bn + δ), there exists b > 0 such that such
that for any b ≤ b, ﬁrms gain from information sharing, or Πb > Πs.
Proof. Seen Appendix.
Thus, for given n, β, and γ, ρn large relative to ρ is a necessary condition for ﬁrms to
gain from information sharing. Intuitively, given the change in market structure that favors
grower welfare, ﬁrms can only gain if there is a suﬃciently large increase in information about
uncertain future demand. Similarly, when ﬁrms’ outputs are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (γ
small), there are potential gains from information sharing. Given these necessary conditions,
ﬁrms tend to gain from information sharing cum a change in market structure, only when
aggregate farm supply is suﬃciently ﬂat. Or in other words, when the change in market
structure that results from information sharing is suﬃciently small.
Note that because rc is a monotonic function of s, each ﬁrm’s information about down-
stream demand can be transmitted to competing ﬁrms through the input price negotiated
with the bargaining association. This result provides a clear link between information shar-
ing and the traditional role of bargaining associations in setting an “industry” price, and
contrasts with information sharing in the context of a trade association where there is no
clear mechanism for implementation (e.g, Vives, 1990; Kirby, 1988).
Market Structure. Of course, we have only identiﬁed one possible equilibrium price that the
bargaining association might choose. For example, a bargaining association might set a price
r to maximize expected grower surplus given the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms. For a given
price rm, intermediary ﬁrms choose the quantity qb(rm) deﬁned above. If growers can set
a noncompetitive price, ex post grower surplus is given by (rm − a)Qb(rm) − bQb(rm)2/2,
where of course Qb(rm) = nqb(rm). It is not too diﬃcult to demonstrate that maximizing
this expression with respect to rm leads to the equilibrium monopoly price for growers,
rm = (aδ+(α+ρns)(nb+δ))/(nb+2δ). Provided the equilibrium quantity given in equation
(9) is strictly positive, it is simple to verify that rm > rc. Also, this price is again monotonic
in s and can thus be used to implement information sharing. More generally, given some
bargaining rule, it may be possible to identify equilibrium prices between rc and rm.14
18However, setting a noncompetitive price for farm output creates short-run coordination
diﬃculties, and potentially generates incentives for long-run entry. At such a price, supply
exceeds demand and there thus needs to be some mechanism for allocating available demand
across growers. One possible rationing mechanism is the set of contractual oﬀers made by
ﬁrms. That is, ﬁrms can only oﬀer contracts for the amount that they demand at the price
rm, thus ensuring that growers do not produce on their aggregate supply curve. However,
once the price for farm output is set, there is nothing to stop growers from competing amongst
themselves for contract acreage. Firms are of course obligated to pay the bargained price,
but enforcement of this obligation is more costly in a setting where growers have no incentive
to report on attempted undercutting. That is, given that growers are oﬀ their supply curve,
each grower would willingly accept a secret price cut in return for the processor agreeing to
accept a bit more of the grower’s output. Because payments typically do not go through the
bargaining association (we are not aware of any examples where they do), it would be diﬃcult
to enforce a negotiated noncompetitive price, absent some explicit enforcement of production
quotas.15 Although these sorts of coordination and enforcement problems are perhaps less
severe than with collusion among growers and ﬁrms, they are nevertheless substantial.
Conclusion
We provide a rationale for the existence of bargaining associations in agricultural markets
that is entirely independent of the role they may play in countervailing market power. In
markets with a large proportion of contracted production, and a corresponding absence of
spot markets, traditional modes of price discovery are mostly absent. One possible substitute
for price discovery via markets is direct communication among competing ﬁrms concerning
expected future supply and demand conditions. However, such communication is not possible
without a government sanctioned exception to anti-trust regulation.
We treat farm bargaining as the mechanism through which such an exception is granted.
In the spirit of work by Vives (1984), Li (1985) and Raith (1996), we model information
sharing among intermediary ﬁrms as a Bayesian game in which each of n ﬁrms receives a
signal of future demand that can be shared with other ﬁrms. In addition to developing a
novel perspective on the role of bargaining associations in agricultural markets, our analysis
19contributes to the information sharing literature by incorporating an intermediate input
sector, and also by considering the role of a market input price as a means of implementing
information-sharing equilibria.
Information sharing tends to beneﬁt consumers and growers, but has ambiguous conse-
quences for expected ﬁrm proﬁts. Information sharing allows ﬁrms to increase the precision
of estimated future demand, but because the signals each ﬁrm receives are positively corre-
lated (a natural assumption, given the nature of the markets we study), information sharing
also tends to increase the correlation among ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. In markets where
ﬁnal outputs are substitutes, ﬁrm strategies are strategic substitutes, so that a positive cor-
relation of strategies reduces expected proﬁt. Thus, the eﬀects of information sharing tend
to countervail with respect to expected proﬁts, and complement with respect to consumer
and grower surplus. Although “bargaining as information sharing” tends to generate welfare
gains, most of these gains go to growers, not to the ﬁrms who share information.
Even when expected proﬁts for ﬁrms increase as a result of information sharing, ﬁrms
face a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the equilibrium behavior of each ﬁrm is to not report its
information (not reporting when other ﬁrms report reduces the correlation of strategies, with
no eﬀect on the precision of estimated future demand). This equilibrium can be overcome if
ﬁrms form an ex ante contract requiring full information disclosure once signals have been
received. We demonstrate how cooperative bargaining, and in particular the setting of an
industry price for farm output, represents one means of implementing such a contract. Thus,
it also possible to interpret bargaining legislation as an exception to anti-trust that facilitates
(indirect) communication among ﬁrms.
In addition, our work provides some insight as to why bargaining associations may not
result in signiﬁcant price enhancement. Information sharing in itself results in higher surplus
for growers by inducing stronger competition among intermediary ﬁrms. Firms, who some-
times beneﬁt from information sharing despite the increased competition (though always to
a much lesser degree than growers), may be willing to go along with bargaining so long as
growers are not too aggressive in their price demand.
Whether bargaining is primarily a mechanism for information exchange and price discov-
ery, or a means for growers to countervail, or possibly even to exercise, market power, has
20important consequences for the welfare eﬀects of farm bargaining. Given the nested nature
of these hypotheses in our model, a test can in principle be carried out. The recent work
of Doyle and Snyder (1999) provides some direction for such an eﬀort. For example, one
clear prediction of the information sharing hypothesis, relative to the pure exercise of market
power, is an increase in the correlation among ﬁrm strategies. All else equal, this should
lead to greater variation in aggregate market output. One possible direction for empirical
work is thus a comparison of variability in industry production and prices across markets
with and without bargaining activity, or within a single industry before and after entry of a
bargaining institution. Alternatively, diﬀerences across commodities in the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, in aggregate supply and demand responsiveness, and in the number of
competing ﬁrms, have implications for the magnitude of eﬃciency gains from information
sharing. Presumably, it should be more likely that bargaining emerge in equilibrium where
it is Pareto optimal (or at least where intermediary ﬁrms do not experience large welfare
losses). With a suﬃcient number of commodities, it is conceivable that a cross sectional test
of this sort could be carried out.
Finally, we focus on information-sharing, but ignore other important aspects of farm bar-
gaining. In general, our results suggest there are potential welfare gains from farm bargain-
ing. However, grower heterogeneity, and the resulting potential ineﬃciencies associated with
negotiating a single industry price, may to some extent oﬀset these positive welfare gains.
Grower heterogeneity is also likely to substantially increase the institutional cost of admin-
istering a bargaining association. Endogonizing the formation of a bargaining association
in the presence of grower heterogeneity thus represents another potentially fruitful direction
for future research.
21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Proof that expected grower surplus increases, and that expected con-
sumer surplus increases whenever expected ﬁrm proﬁts increase, is presented in the text. To
show that expected total surplus always increases with information sharing, we need to show
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Let us denote by k (n) ≡ f (n) − g (n). We want to document the number and the location
of the roots of the equation k (n) = 0. First note that k(1) = 0.
Next consider the behavior of k (n) for n → ±∞. It is routine to show the limit of k (n)
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k (n) is a ratio of two polynomials and its numerator is a third degree polynomial. Thus, using
each of the three limits deﬁned above, we conclude that k (n) is strictly positive whenever
n > 1 if the other two roots are strictly lower than 1. To study these roots, we ﬁrst note
that the numerator of k (n) is given by
2
4 γ (8βσε (γ − β) − 4σνβ2 + 3σνβγ − 2σεγ2)n
−γ2σε (β − γ)n2 + (γ − 2β)
2 (σεγ − 3σεβ − 3σνβ)
3
5(σε + σν)(n − 1)σν
We thus have two possibilities. Either the term in the bracket has complex roots, in which
case k (n) is strictly positive for any n > 1, or the term in the bracket has real roots. The










22and it is easy to see that one of these roots is strictly negative. Therefore the other is strictly
lower than 1 if k (n) is a continuous function for any n ≥ 1. This is can be established by
showing that all the vertical asymptotes of k (n) occur for n ≤ 0. The denominator of k (n)
can be written as
(2σεβ − σεγ + 2σνβ + nσεγ)
2 (γ − 3β − nγ)(σν + nσε),
and with this expression it is routine to check that all asymptotes occur for n ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this result, we consider an equilibrium where n − k ﬁrms
report their private signal whereas the k remaining ﬁrms do not. In the ﬁrst step, we
compute the equilibrium strategies of a ﬁrm who belongs to the set of non revealing ﬁrms,
and we derive the equilibrium expected proﬁt for this ﬁrm. In the second step, we compute
the equilibrium strategies and expected proﬁt of the same ﬁrm when it reports its signal.
Comparing expected proﬁts in the two cases, we then show that choosing to reveal results
in a lower expected proﬁt for any k ∈ {1,2,...,n}.
Step 1: We ﬁrst deﬁne and compute a ﬁrm’s strategy when it belongs to the set of
non revealing ﬁrms. We use the subscript i (resp. j) when referencing nonrevealing (resp.
revealing) ﬁrms. Given the information available when production decisions are made, the
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where a prime is used to indicate nonrevealing ﬁrms other than i. Similarly, the expected




























23We suppose that ﬁrms use strategies that are aﬃne in the relevant signals, with the
following form:
qi = C0i + C1i
n−k X
j=1
sj + C2isi (A.1)































































and using the strategies deﬁned in (A.1) and (A.2), we can then derive the ﬁrst order
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Step 2: Next, we compute the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm when it chooses to not report its
signal. There are now n − k + 1 reporting ﬁrms and k − 1 nonreporting ﬁrms. Using the
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25Again, solving this system for the ﬁve unknown parameters in equations (A.1) and (A.2)
yields a new set of equilibrium coeﬃcients. In this case, we are only concerned with the
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Finally, it is tedious but fortunately not diﬃcult to show that Πj is strictly smaller than Πi.
In particular, we obtain




It is immediate to verify that the inequality (A.3) holds for any k ∈ {1,2,...,n}, and therefore
that nonrevelation is a dominant strategy for all ﬁrms.
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting the behavioral rule qb
i(r) into the aggregate supply rela-
tion r = a+b
P
i qi(r) yields the expression for rc. Substituting this back into the expression
for qb
i(r) yields qb




i) = (α2 + σερn)/(δ − b)2.
We want to know when expected ﬁrm proﬁt under information sharing, and at input price
rc, is at least as large as expected ﬁrm proﬁt when there is no information sharing. Under







































26When b = 0, condition (A.4) becomes
[4β (σν + σε)(β − γ) − γ2 (n − 1)(σν + σε + nσε)](n − 1)βσνσ2
ε
(2β (σν + σε) + (n − 1)γσε)
2 (2β + (n − 1)γ)
2 (σν + nσε)
> 0












On the other hand, when b approaches β (i.e., b large relative to β), condition (A.4) is clearly
violated. Thus we demonstrate the existence of b, as claimed in the proposition.
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30Notes
1Of course, there is no way beyond simple regulatory enforcement to ensure that growers
and processors do not collectively collude to maximize joint surplus. However, given the
atomistic nature of farming, and the relatively low barriers to entry in processing, it is
doubtful that such collusion, which requires enforcement of output quotas, could be sustained
in long-run equilibrium.
2State or federal bargaining legislation, or possibly an industry-wide marketing order to
establish an annual market price, are two ways that such a contract might be implemented.
For example, California agricultural code relating to cooperative bargaining deﬁnes refusal to
negotiate or bargain by any ﬁrm wishing to purchase from a bargaining association member
as an “unfair trading practice,” and contains provisions for both ﬁnancial penalties and
injunctive relief in the event of refusal to negotiate (see Division 1, Chapter 20, Articles 2
and 4 of the California Food and Agriculture Code, 2004).
3Nevertheless, the settings in which unraveling occurs are still restrictive in that ﬁrms are
only allowed to missreport their information by concealment. Because any information that
is reported is certiﬁable as valid, ﬁrms cannot lie or make statements about information they
do not have. Crawford and Sobel (1982) study strategic transmission of information that is
not certiﬁable as valid. In such a setting, full and truthful reporting only occurs when the
relevant agents’ preferences are suﬃciently congruent. However, there may be other reasons
to expect honest reporting in a setting where the relevant information is noncertiﬁable and
preferences are noncongruent. For example, Doyle and Snyder (1999) argue that a reputation
for honesty has value and may encourage truthful reporting (see Sobel (1985) for a formal
model along these lines). In any case, it is diﬃcult to imagine observing how ﬁrms transmit
information, and whether or not the relevant information is potentially certiﬁable as valid.
Instead, we must rely on predictions regarding observable outcomes to identify the right set
of modeling assumptions. We provide some direction for how such empirical work might be
carried out in our conclusion.
314The recent case study by Genesove and Mullin (1997) on information exchange in the US
sugar industry seems consistent with this sort of logic, and provides additional support for
our assumption of truthful reporting. In the study, the authors analyze the tasks performed
by a cane sugar trade association during the 1920’s. The main task of the association was
to gather information reported by individual ﬁrms and then to aggregate and redistribute
this information to the association. Genesove and Mullin (1997) ﬁnd no evidence of false
reporting. They write, “In sum, it may be too diﬃcult to construct a credible, systematic
lie, since a variety of bits of information, both internal and external to the ﬁrm, have to be
made consistent with any false report.” They attribute this true reporting to the expertise
of the association directors who were apparently capable of detecting misreports by using
other sources of information as checks. They further write “These other sources did not
enable outsiders to observe the ﬁrm’s private information perfectly, but it may have enabled
them to provide accurate assessment to deter lying” (pg. 7). It seems reasonable to think
of the executive director of a bargaining association providing a similar kind of expertise.
5Of the 36 associations sampled, 31 cited increased price stability, 32 cited improved
information, and 25 cited improved price discovery. When queried about services oﬀered to
growers, only “price negotiation” and “time and method of payment” were similarly cited
by more than 30 associations.
6Although the setting is diﬀerent, Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984) similarly document ev-
idence supporting potential eﬃciency consequences from collective bargaining in the non-
agricultural sector.
7Ralph Bunje was a leading spokesman and proponent of farm bargaining for over 30
years during his tenure as manager of the California Canning Peach Association
8This speciﬁcation of the farm sector ignores grower heterogeneity, which may be impor-
tant in considering the incentives for growers to form a bargaining association. We consider
the industry-wide incentives to form a bargaining association, independent of the organiza-
tional and administrative diﬃculties created by grower heterogeneity.
329Allowing ﬁrms to have asymmetric and correlated signal technologies (e.g., E[ν2
i ] = σi
ν,
and E[νiνj] 6= 0) would complicate presentation without signiﬁcantly altering our qualitative
conclusions. See Vives (1984) for a treatment along these lines.
10We take each ﬁrm’s desire to coordinate with growers in period 1 (rather than compete
for aggregate output in period 2) as given. This is consistent with the notion that ﬁrms
“contract” with growers, rather than purchase output on some kind of spot market. Under-
standing why ﬁrms choose to contract is an interesting problem, but one that lies beyond the
scope of this article. Interestingly, as noted in the previous section, the absence of spot mar-
kets (and the corresponding prevalence of contracted arrangements) seems to be a necessary
condition for the establishment of bargaining associations.
11If reporting ﬁrms can prohibit nonreporting ﬁrms from receiving information submitted
by reporting ﬁrms, then information sharing may be an equilibrium outcome. For a article
that considers exclusionary information sharing of this sort, see Kirby (1988). However,
exclusionary information sharing presumes that ﬁrms are playing something other than a
simultaneous move game at the information reporting stage. Note also that ﬁrms will reveal
some information when choosing quantities, so that full exclusion will never be possible.
12Absent such a commitment, ﬁrms can choose to report nothing without implicitly reveal-
ing their desire to not report (which would convey some, possibly all, relevant information).
13However, even if ﬁrms lose as a result of the change in market structure associated with
farm bargaining, it is still conceivable that bargaining occur in equilibrium if growers have
suﬃcient political support.
14An anonymous referee pointed out that the bargaining association might also set a price
below the competitive price rc, but above the oligopoly price with no information sharing.
In this case, there would be excess demand for the growers’ output, but price would go no
higher than rc. Such a scenario might be an equilibrium outcome in a setting where growers
and ﬁrms both gain from information sharing, but where ﬁrms have most of the bargaining
power.
3315Helmberger and Hoos (1965) study exactly this problem in a full information setting,
and conclude that, though the problem is generally indeterminate, there is some opportunity
for a bargaining association to raise the price paid to growers, relative to the price paid by
oligopsony buyers. More generally, there is a large literature devoted to “bilateral monopoly”
where this type of problem is treated, for example, Fellner (1947), and Deschamps and
Jaskold-Gabszewicz (1975). Our more modest interest in this section is only to demonstrate
that even when information sharing is accompanied by a change in market structure that
favors growers, there is still potential for Pareto gain.















Figure 1: Diﬀerence in expected surplus with and without information sharing
as ﬁrm outputs become increasingly substitutable in consumer preferences.













Figure 2: Diﬀerence in expected surplus with and without information sharing
as the number of ﬁrms increase.
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